We extend the applied pi calculus with state cells, which are used to reason about protocols that store persistent information. Examples are protocols involving databases or hardware modules with internal state. We distinguish between private state cells, which are not available to the attacker, and public state cells, which arise when a private state cell is compromised by the attacker. For processes involving only private state cells we define observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity in the same way as in the original applied pi calculus, and show that they coincide. Our result implies Abadi-Fournet's theorem -the coincidence of observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity -in a revised version of the applied pi calculus. For processes involving public state cells, we can essentially keep the definition of observational equivalence, but need to strengthen the definition of labelled bisimulation in order to show that observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity coincide in this case as well.
Introduction
Security protocols are small distributed programs that use cryptography in order to achieve a security goal. The complexity that arises from their distributed nature motivates formal analysis in order to prove logical properties of their behaviour; fortunately, they are often small enough to make this kind of analysis feasible. Various logical methods have been used to model security protocols; process calculi have been particularly successful [3, 5, 31] . For example, the TLS protocol used by billions of users every day was analysed using ProVerif [11] .
More recently, protocol analysis methods have been applied to stateful protocols -that is, protocols which involve persistent state information that can affect and be changed by protocol runs. Hardware devices that have some internal memory can be described by such protocols. For example, Yubikey is a USB device which generates one-time passwords based on encryptions of a secret ID, a running counter and some random values using a unique AES-128 key contained in the device. The trusted platform module (TPM) is another hardware chip that has a variety of registers which represent its state, and protocols for updating them. Radio-frequency identification (RFID) is a wireless technology for automatic identification and is currently deployed in electronic passports, tags for consumer goods, livestock and pets tracking, etc. An RFID-tag has a small area for storing secrets, which may be modified.
A process calculus can be made to work with such stateful protocols either by extension or by encoding. Extension means adding to the calculus explicit constructs for working with the stateful aspects, while encoding means using combinations of the primitives that already exist. Encodings have the advantage that they keep the calculus simple and elegant, but (as argued in [3] ) there may not be encodings for all the aspects we want, and in cases that encodings exist they may not be suitable for the analysis of security properties. StatVerif [7] demonstrates this: a natural way of encoding state using restricted channels prevents ProVerif from proving security. ProVerif also provides some built-in features, such as tables and phases, which provide only limited ways for modelling states. In particular, tables are defined as predicates which allow processes to store data by extending a predicate for the data. Hence there is no notion of the "current" state, and values cannot be deleted from tables. Phases are used to model the protocols with several stages. But there can be only finitely many phases, which can only be run in sequence, whereas a state may have infinitely many arbitrary values. Since our starting point is the applied pi calculus [3] , we follow the philosophy adopted by its authors, which is to design a calculus that has the right primitives built in.
Our Contributions. We present an extension of the applied pi calculus by adding state cells, which are used to reason about protocols that store persistent information. We distinguish between private state cells, which are not available to the attacker, and public state cells, which arise when a private state cell is compromised by the attacker. In our stateful language, a private state cell is guarded by the scope restriction; its access is limited to some designated processes. When a private state cell gets compromised, the cell becomes public and this scenario is modelled by removing the scope restriction of that cell. We first define observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity for processes having only private state cells, and we prove that two notions coincide as expected. By encoding the private state cells with restricted channels while keeping observational equivalence, our coincidence result can be seen to imply Abadi-Fournet's theorem [3, Theorem 1] , in a revised version of applied pi calculus. As far as we can see, the only available proof for this theorem is [28] which is an unpublished manuscript. Despite having no published proof, this theorem has been widely used in many publications, for example [19, 8, 4, 18, 20] .
We also discuss an extension of our language with public state cells. The obvious notion of labelled bisimilarity does not capture observational equivalence on public state cells. Designing a labelled bisimilarity on public state cells turns out to be unexpectedly difficult. Public state cells introduce many special language features which are significantly different from private state cells. Moreover, the addition of public state cells increases the capabilities of the attacker significantly. Hence we strengthen the definition of labelled bisimilarity to show that observational equivalence and labelled bisimulation coincide.
As an illustration, we analyse the OSK protocol [26] for RFID tags. We model its untraceability by private state cells and model its forward privacy by public state cells.
Related Work. StatVerif [7] is an extension of ProVerif process language [13] with private state cells. The main contribution there is to extend the ProVerif compiler to a compiler for StatVerif. The security property of interest there is secrecy which is modelled by reachability on the traces. This paper is a fundamental generalisation of the previous StatVerif work. The focus in this paper is to build a stateful language based on applied pi calculus, explore its language features and discuss indistinguishability, which is modelled by observational equivalence and analysed by labelled bisimilarity.
There are other languages that have been used to model protocols involving persistent state, but they are lower-level languages that are further away than our process language from the protocol design. Strand spaces have been generalised to work with the global state required by a trusted party charged with enforcing fair exchange [25] . The verifier Tamarin [33] uses multi-set rewriting (in which antecedents of applied rules are withdrawn from the knowledge set in order to represent state changes); it has been used to analyse hardware password tokens [27] . Multi-set rewriting is also used in [30] , where state changes are important to represent revocation of cryptographic keys. Horn clauses rather than multiset rewriting are used in [22] , in order to represent state changes made to registers of the TPM hardware module.
Reasoning about programming languages involving states has been extensively studied (e.g. [34, 23] ). There are very strong interactions between programing language features and state, hence the reasoning principles are very specific to the precise combination of features. In this work we build on the work on reasoning principles for process calculi using bisimulation and show how to extend these principles to handle global state.
Outline. The next section defines syntax and semantics for the stateful applied pi calculus. Section 3 discusses the process equivalences and encoding for private state cells, and derives Abadi-Fournet's theorem. Section 4 extends our stateful language with public state cells. The paper concludes in Section 5.
Stateful Applied Pi Calculus
In this section, we extend the applied pi calculus [3] with constructs for states, and define its operational semantics. In fact, we do not directly build the stateful language on top of applied pi calculus, because we want to avoid working with the structural equivalence relation. More precisely, reasoning about the equivalent classes induced by structural equivalence turns out to be difficult and normally results in long tedious proofs [21, 18, 29, 17] . Our language inherits constructs for scope restriction, communication and active substitutions from applied pi calculus while having multisets of processes and active substitutions makes it possible to specify an operational semantics which does not involve any structural equivalence.
Syntax
We assume two disjoint, infinite sets N and V of names and variables, respectively. We rely on a sort system including a universal base sort, a cell sort and a channel sort. The sort system splits N into channel names N ch , base names N b and cell names N s ; similarly, V is split into channel variables V ch and base variables V b . Unless otherwise stated, we use a, b, c as channel names, s, t as cell names, and x, y, z as variables. Meta variables u, v, w are used to range over both names and variables.
A signature Σ consists of a finite set of function symbols, each with an arity. A function symbol with arity 0 is a constant. Function symbols are required to take arguments and produce results of the base sort only. Terms, ranged over by M, N , are built up from variables and names by function application:
We write var (M ) and name(M ) for the variables and names in M , respectively. Tuples such as u 1 · · · u and M 1 · · · M will be denoted by u and M , respectively. Terms are equipped with an equational theory = Σ that is an equivalence relation closed under substitutions of terms for variables, one-to-one renamings and function applications. The grammar for the plain process is given below. The operators for nil process 0, parallel composition |, replication !, scope restriction νn, conditional if -then -else , input u(x) and output u M are the same as the ones in applied pi calculus [3] . A state cell is a special process of the form [s → M ] where s is the cell name and M is the current value of s. The process lock s.P locks the cell s for the subsequent process P . When the cell s is locked, another process that intends to access the cell has to wait until the cell is unlocked by a primitive unlock s. The process read s as x.P reads the value in the cell and stores it in x in P . The process s := M.P assigns the value M to the cell and continues as P .
P, Q, R
writing a cell read s as x.P reading a cell lock s.P locking a cell unlock s.P unlocking a cell subject to the following requirements:
-x, M, N are not of cell sort; u ∈ N ch ∪ V ch and s ∈ N s ; additionally, M is of base sort in both [s → M ] and s := M. P ; -for every lock s. P , the part P of the process must not include parallel or replication unless it is after an unlock s. -for a given cell name s, the replication operator ! must not occur between νs and
These side conditions rule out some nonsense processes, such as lock s. !P , lock s. 
} is a multiset of pairs where P i is a plain process and
, the part of the process P i must not include parallel or replication unless it is after a unlock s; we write locks(P) for the set
In an extended process ν n.(σ, S, P), the substitution σ is similar to the active substitutions in applied pi calculus [3] which denote the static knowledge that the process exposes to the environment. A minor difference with [3] is that substitutions here are only defined on terms of base sort which will be explained later. State cells are mutable and the value of a cell may be changed during the running of processes. If a process P locks a cell s, then this status information will be kept as (P, {s} ∪ L) in P. At any time, the cell s can be locked at most once in P.
The variable x in "u(x)" and "read s as x" are bound, as well as the name n in νn. This leads to the usual notions of bound and free names and variables. We shall use fn(A) for free names, use fs(A) for free cell names, use fv (A) for free variables, use bn(A) for bound names, and use bv (A) for bound variables of A. Let fnv (A) = fn(A) ∪ fv (A) and bnv (A) = bn(A) ∪ bv (A). Following the conventions in [32] , we shall identify processes which are α-convertible. We write "=" for both syntactical equality and equivalence under α-conversion. Captures of bound names and bound variables are avoided by implicit α-conversion.
An extended process ν n.(σ, S, P) is called closed if each variable is either defined by σ or bound, each cell name s is defined by exactly one "s → M " (either in S or in P), and locks(P) ⊆ dom(S). We may write (σ, S, P) for ν∅.(σ, S, P), and write ν n, m.(σ, S, P) for ν( n ∪ m).(σ, S, P).
When we write σ = σ 1 ∪ σ 2 for some substitution σ or S = S 1 ∪ S 2 for some state cells S, we assume that dom(
An evaluation context ν n.(σ-, S-, P-) is an extended process with holes "-" for substitution, state cells and plain processes. Let C = ν n.(σ-, S-, P-) be an evaluation context and
if a ∈ n and M is of base sort and x is fresh
Fig. 1. Operational Semantics
C to A is an extended process defined by:
is a closed extended process.
Operational Semantics
The transition relation A α − → A is the smallest relation on extended processes defined by the rules in Figure 1 . The action α is either an internal action τ , an input a(x), an output of channel name a c , an output of bound channel name νc.a c , or an output of terms of base sort νx.a x . The transitions for conditional branch, communication, sending and receiving channel names and complex messages are typical and essentially the same as the ones in applied pi calculus. In particular, the output νx.a x for term M generates an "alias" x for M which is kept in the substitution part of the extended process. As mentioned before, state cells are used to model the hardware or the database to which the access is usually mutually-exclusive. When a state cell is locked, the other process that intends to access the cell must wait until the cell is released.
Private State Cells

Equivalences for Private State Cells
We first discuss observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity on the extended processes with only private state cells, that is, each cell name s occurring in the processes is within the scope of a restriction νs. We will discuss an extension of the language with public state cells in Section 4.
Observational equivalence [3] has been widely used to model properties of security protocols. It captures the intuition of indistinguishability from the attacker's point of view. Security properties such as anonymity [4] , privacy [20, 6] and strong secrecy [12] are usually formalised by observational equivalence.
We write =⇒ for the reflexive and transitive closure of
Definition 1. Observational equivalence (≈) is the largest symmetric relation R on pairs of closed extended processes with only private state cells, such that A R B implies (i) dom(A) = dom(B); (ii) if A ⇓ a then B ⇓ a ; (iii) if A =⇒ A then B =⇒ B and A R B for some B ; (iv) for all closing evaluation contexts C with only private cells, C[A] R C[B].
Observational equivalence is a contextual equivalence where the contexts model the active attackers who can intercept and forge messages. In the following examples, we illustrate the use of observational equivalence in the stateful language by analysing the untraceability of the RFID tags.
Example 1.
We start by analysing a naive protocol for RFID tag identification. The tag simply reads its id and sends it to the reader. We assume the attacker can eavesdrop on the radio frequency signals between the tag and the reader. In other words, all the communications between the tag and the reader are visible to the attacker. The operations on the tag can be modelled by: P (s) = read s as x. a x . One security concern for RFID tags is to avoid third-party attacker tracking. The attacker is not supposed to trace the tag according to its outputs. Using the definition in [6] , the untraceability can be modelled by observational equivalence:
In the left process, each tag s can be used at most once. In the right process, each tag s can be used an unbounded number of times. The above equivalence does not hold, which means this protocol is traceable. By eavesdropping on channel a of the right process, the attacker can get a data sequence: "id , id , id · · · ", while a particular id can occur at most once in the first process.
Example 2. The OSK protocol [26] is a simple identification protocol for RFID tags which aims to satisfy third-party untraceability. The tag can perform two independent one-way functions g and h. An initial secret is stored in the tag and is known to the back-end database. On each run of the protocol, the tag computes the hash g of its current value and sends the result to the reader. The reader forwards the message to the back-end database for identification. The tag then updates its value with the hash h of its current value. The operations related to a tag s can be modelled by:
a g(x) . s := h(x). unlock s
Let RD be process modelling the reader and back-end database. Similar to Example 1, the untraceability can be represented by
In the second process, for a particular tag s which contains value k, the data sequence observed by the attacker on channel a is "g(k), g(h(k)), g(h(h(k))) · · · ". Without knowing the secret k, these appear just random data to the attacker and so the attacker cannot link these data to the same tag. The observational equivalence between these two processes means the attacker cannot identify the multiple runnings of a particular tag. The "lock s · · · unlock s" ensures exclusive access to the tag. After the reader reads the tag, the tag must be renewed before the next access to the tag; otherwise the tag would be traceable.
The universal quantifier over the contexts makes it difficult to prove observational equivalence. Hence labelled bisimilarity is introduced in [3] to capture observational equivalence. Labelled bisimilarity consists of static equivalence and behavioural equivalence. 
Our definition of static equivalence is essentially the same as the one in [3] , as the definition in [3] is invariant under structural equivalence already. Although static equivalence is in general undecidable, there are well established ways, including tools, for verifying static equivalence [2, 15, 16, 9, 14] . Static equivalence defines the indistinguishability between the environmental knowledge exposed by two processes. The environmental knowledge is modelled by the substitutions in the extended processes. Instead of using arbitrary contexts, labelled bisimilarity relies on the direct comparison of the transitions. The following theorem states that labelled bisimilarity can fully capture observational equivalence:
Theorem 1. On closed extended processes with only private state cells, it holds that
≈ = ≈ l .
Encoding Private State Cells with Restricted Channels
Private state cells can be encoded by restricted channels. This is an important observation; moreover, we will use this to prove Abadi-Fournet's theorem in the following Section 3.3. However, when modelling security protocols, the drawback of representing private state cells by restricted channels is that it may introduce false attacks when using the automatic tool ProVerif as argued in [7] . The reason is that some features of restricted channels are abstracted away when ProVerif translates process calculus into Horn clauses [13] . To solve this problem, we introduce the primitives for lock, read, write and unlock which will help us design better translations for stateful protocols in ProVerif. This has been demonstrated by the verification of reachability [7] , and will be useful in future for verifying observational equivalence.
We encode the extended processes with only private state cells into a subset of the extended processes which do not contain any cell name. Since the target language of the encoding does not have any cell name, we abbreviate extended processes ν n. (σ, ∅, {(P i , ∅)} i∈I ) with no cell name to ν n.(σ, {P i } i∈I ).
First we define encoding P S in Figure 2 for the plain process P under a given set of state cells S = {s 1 → M 1 , . . . , s n → M n }. For each cell s, we select a fresh channel name c s . The encoding in Figure 2 only affects the part related to cell names, leaving other parts like input and output unchanged. The state cell s → M and unlock s are both encoded by an output c s M on the restricted channel c s . The lock s is represented by an input c s (x) on the same channel c s . To read the cell read s as x, we use the input c s (x) to get the value from the cell and then put the value back c s x , which enables the other operations on cell s in future. To write a new value into the cell s := N , we need to first consume the existing c s M by an input c s (x) and then generate a new output c s N . Our encoding ensures that there is only one output c s M available on a specified restricted channel c s at each moment. When the cell is locked, namely c s M is consumed by some c s (x), the other processes that intend to access the cell have to wait until an output c s N is available.
Let A = ν s, n. σ, {s i → M i } i∈I , {(P j , L j )} j∈J be an extended process 1 where s ⊂ N s and n ∩ N s = ∅. We define the encoding A as:
Intuitively, U is the indices of the unlocked state cells in {s i → M i } i∈I , and S j is the set of state cells locked by L j .
Example 3. Let A = νs.(∅, {s → 0} , {(T (s), ∅)}) where T (s) is defined in Example 2. Then A = νc s .(∅, c s 0 , T (s) ∅ ) with T (s) ∅ = c s (z).a g(z) .c s h(z) obtained by: T (s) ∅ = lock s.read s as x.a g(x) .s := h(x).unlock s ∅ = c s (z). read s as x.a g(x) .s := h(x).unlock s {s →z}
= c s (z). a g(z) .s := h(z).unlock s {s →z}
= c s (z).a g(z) . s := h(z).unlock s {s →z}
= c s (z).a g(z) . unlock s {s →h(z)}
= c s (z).a g(z) .c s h(z)
Theorem 2. For two closed extended processes A, B with only private state cells, we have A ≈ B iff A ≈ e B where ≈ e is an equivalence defined exactly the same as Definition 1 except the context C does not contain any cell names.
Overview of the Proof of Abadi-Fournet's Theorem
We shall use our Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 to derive Abadi-Fournet's theorem, namely Theorem 1 in [3] . We revise the original applied pi calculus [3] slightly: active substitutions are only defined on terms of base sort; otherwise Theorem 1 in [3] does not hold [10] . 2 Since the active substitutions in applied pi calculus float everywhere in the extended processes, in order to prove Abadi-Fournet's theorem, we need to normalise the extended processes first. We can transform the extended processes in the applied pi calculus -denoted by A r , B r , C r to avoid confusion -into the extended processes in stateful applied pi calculus by function T (assume bound names are pairwise-distinct and different from free names):
Intuitively, T pulls out name restrictions, applies active substitutions and separates them from the plain processes, and eliminates variable restrictions. For instance, T (a x .νn.a n | νk. {k/x}) = νk.({k/x} , {a k .νn.a n }). This normalisation T preserves both observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity: 
Extending the Language with Public State Cells
Public State Cells
Hardware modules like TPMs and smart cards are intended to be secure, but an attacker might succeed in finding ways of compromising their tamper-resistant features. Similarly, attackers can potentially hack into databases [1] . We model these attacks by considering that the attacker compromises the private state cells, after which they are public. Protocols may provide some security properties that hold even under such compromises of the hardware or database. A typical example is forward privacy [24] which requires the past events remain secure even if the attacker compromises the device. This will be further discussed in the following Example 8 and Example 9. A cell s not in the scope of νs is public, which enables the attacker to lock the cell, read its contents or overwrite it. We now give the details of the syntactic additions for public cells and the definition of observational equivalence. To let a private state cell become public, we extend the plain processes in Section 2 with a new primitive open s.P Extended processes are defined as before. We extend the transitions in Fig. 1 
by a new transition relation τ (s)
−−→ defined 3 We write σ * for the result of composing the substitution σ with itself repeatedly until an idempotent substitution is reached. 
(σ, S, P ∪ {(a M .P, L)}) with a /
∈ n.
Definition 4. Observational equivalence (≈) is the largest symmetric relation R on pairs of closed extended processes (which may contain public state cells) such that A R B implies (i) locks(A) = locks(B), fs(A) = fs(B) and dom(A) = dom(B); (ii) if A ⇓ a then B ⇓ a ; (iii) if A =⇒ A then B =⇒ B and A R B for some B ; (iv) for all closing evaluation contexts C, C[A] R C[B].
We stick to the original definition of observational equivalence [3] as much as possible in order to capture the intuition of indistinguishability from the attacker's point of view. The definition of observational equivalence on public state cells is similar to the one for private state cells, but the language features of public state cells are significantly different from private state cells. Moreover, the addition of public state cells increases the power of the attacker significantly, as without the name restriction νs for a state cell s, when s is unlocked, the attacker can lock the cell, read its content and overwrite it. To illustrate this point, we start by analysing several examples. 
Cell s is unlocked in both A and B. Both A and B can write 0 or 1 to the cell s arbitrary number of times. The only difference between A and B is the initial values in cell s. A and B are not observationally equivalent because the context C = (-, -, {(read s as x. if x = 0 then c b , {s})} -) can distinguish them. The context C holds the lock of cell s, thus no one can change the value in s when C reads the value. We have
In comparison, the following processes are observationally equivalent:
Cell s is locked in both A and B . When a cell is locked, the attacker cannot see its value until it is unlocked. Both A and B can adjust the value of cell s after unlock s.
Then B can match this transition by first unlocking the cell s and then doing a writing s := 0 and evolving to exactly the same process:
Intuitively, the locked or unlocked status of a public state cell is observable by the environment. Therefore, we require locks(A) = locks(B) and fs(A) = fs(B) in the definition of observational equivalence. Furthermore, without this condition, this definition would not yield an equivalence relation, as transitivity does not hold in general. For example, consider the following extended processes,
Without the condition, then A and B would be equivalent, as well as B and C, because the value in s can always be adjusted to be exactly the same after unlock s. But A and C are not equivalent as analysed in Example 5. A and B are not observationally equivalent. Let C = (-, -, {(read s as y. a y , ∅)} -) .
But there is no output on channel c in C [B] . Hence A ≈ B. Now we give examples of the use of public state cells for modelling protocols and security properties. Another security concern for RFID tags is forward privacy [26] . In the following Example 8 and Example 9, we shall illustrate how to model forward privacy by public state cells. Forward privacy requires that even the attacker breaks the tag, the past events should still be untraceable. Public state cells enable us to model the compromised tags.
Example 8.
We consider an improved version of the naive protocol in Example 1. Instead of simply outputting the tag's id, the tag generates a random number r, hashes its id concatenated with r and then sends both r and h(id, r) to the reader for identification. This can be modelled by:
Upon receiving the value, the reader identifies the tag by performing a brute-force search of its known ids. By observing on channel a, the attacker can get the data pairs from a particular tag s: (r 1 , h(id , r 1 )), (r 2 , h(id , r 2 )), (r 3 , h(id , r 3 ) ) · · · . Since the hash function is not invertible, without knowing the value of id, these data appear as just random data to the attacker. Hence this improved version satisfies the untraceability defined in Example 1. But it does not have the forward privacy. Let RD be process modelling the reader and back-end database. The forward privacy can be characterised by the observational equivalence
The primitive open s makes the private state cell s become public. Before the cell s is broken, the attacker cannot decide how the system runs. In other words, whether the tag s is used for only once, namely Q(s), or is used for arbitrary number of times, namely ! Q(s), it is out of the control of the attacker. But after the tag is broken, the attacker fully controls the tag, so he knows when and where the tag is used. Despite knowing the events that happen after the tag is broken, the attacker should still not be able to trace the past events. Therefore, in the first process, we add ! Q(s) after open s to model this scenario. Intuitively, only the events before the tag is broken may be different while the events after the tag is broken are exactly the same. Hence the above observational equivalence can capture forward privacy.
However the above equivalence does not hold which means there is no forward privacy in this protocol. The attacker can obtain the id from the broken tag and then verify whether the previously gathered data (r 1 , h(id , r 1 )) and (r 2 , h(id , r 2 )) refer to the same tag id by hashing id with r 1 (or r 2 ) and then comparing the result with h(id , r 1 ) (or h(id , r 2 )).
Example 9.
Continuing with the OSK protocol in Example 2, we model the forward privacy by the observational equivalence:
Before the tag is broken, the attacker can obtain the data sequence g(k), g(h(k)), g(h(h(k))) · · · by eavesdropping on channel a. Right after each reading, the value in the tag will be updated to the hash of previous value:
When the tag is broken, the attacker will get from the tag a value h i (k) for some integer i. This value is not helpful for the attacker to infer whether the data
are from the same tag. Hence the OSK protocol can ensure the forward privacy.
In order to ease the verification of observational equivalence which is defined using the universal quantifier over contexts, we shall define labelled bisimilarity which replaces quantification over contexts by suitably labelled transitions. The traditional definition for labelled bisimilarity is neither sound nor complete w.r.t. observational equivalence in the presence of public state cells. We propose a novel definition for labelled bisimilarity and show how it solves all the problems caused by public state cells. 
The first rule of =⇒ A for some B. −−→ in labelled bisimilarity because the attacker can set any unlocked public state cell to an arbitrary value. We shall illustrate this point by the following two examples. Now we shall distinguish them in labelled bisimilarity. Since the current value in cell s is 0 which has already been stored in variable y, we don't need to extend A and B.
Definition 5. Labelled bisimilarity (≈ l ) is the largest symmetric relation R between pairs of closed extended processes
Then A can perform the following transition In the presence of public state cells, labelled bisimilarity is both sound and complete with respect to observational equivalence. 
Conclusion
We present a stateful language which is a general extension of applied pi calculus with state cells. We stick to the original definition of observational equivalence [3] as much as possible to capture the intuition of indistinguishability from the attacker's point of view, while design the labelled bisimilarity to furthest abstract observational equivalence. When all the state cells are private, we prove that observational equivalence coincides with labelled bisimilarity, which implies Abadi-Fournet's theorem in a revised version of applied pi calculus. In the presence of public state cells, we devise a labelled bisimilarity which is proved to coincide with observational equivalence. In future, we plan to develop a compiler for bi-processes with state cells to automatically verify the observational equivalence, extending the techniques of ProVerif.
